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BOOK REVIEWS

Class and Race in the Frontier Army: Military
Life in the West, 1870-1890. By Kevin Adams.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009.
xvi + 276 pp. Photographs, notes, bibliography,
index. $34.95.

Class and Race in the Frontier Army is social
history first, military second. Adams has two
theses: that an "enormous class division"
trumped ethnicity, but not race, and that military historians have sought comfort in depicting
the army as socially isolated, a unique institution. A book so critical deserves critique; Class
and Race is both a laudable effort to connect
military to social history, and a product of late
twentieth-century graduate school, producing
focused insights and reminding us of the big picture, but leaving the mid-level blurry. Adams's
historiographical undertone is that whiteness
scholars have exaggerated the racialization of
European immigrants, that the army shows that
ethnicity meant little compared to class or, for
African Americans, racial oppression. Adams
hopes that his study of the army will strike a
blow in the whiteness debates, but his approach
shows how far this scholarship has come (or
drifted) from its original focus on the construction of white supremacy over blacks, which
Adams shows to have been just as true in the
army as civil society. Since the majority of the
army's immigrants were German or Irish, beginning to escape their earlier non-white status by
the 1880s, rather than the "new immigrants"
of southern and eastern Europe, and since the
economic functions of ethnicity (connections
leading to employment) played little part in the
army, that institution seems an unlikely test case
for his thesis about ethnicity.
Nor do the many military historians I know,
including those who read portions of Adams's
work, "prize" an "estranged and isolated army."
Most of them would prefer to identify connections between army and society, where they
were present; Adams is laying into a straw
man of scholarship more than forty years old.
I agree with Adams's subtext, that class was
the most important social force in Gilded Age
America, and in its army. I agree that there was
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an enormous class division, that in class terms
officers were "Victorian aristocrats," and that
enlisted soldiers shared the values (egalitarianism, mutuality) of the contemporary working
class. But this does not make the army a "mere
reflect[ion]" of civil society, with rank and
command hierarchies irrelevant. Adams consistently conflates rank with class hierarchy; he
never hints at the possibility that civil as well
as military elites considered authoritarian command necessary to success on the battlefield.
Military historians should critically examine the concepts of military isolation and its
relationship to professionalization, but this
does not mean that professionalization did not
occur, however haltingly. Nor does it mean that
officers saw themselves primarily as cosmopolitan gentlemen, rather than combat leaders or
representatives of the nation. Most officers
agreed that enlisted soldiers should be freed
from construction details in order to concentrate on military training; one doubts, on the
other hand, whether the soldiers Adams lauds
for their military interests actually preferred the
idea of eight or ten or twelve hours of drill each
day. The real purpose of the army was to show
the national flag, chase Indians (conspicuously
absent here, because enlisted soldiers did not
discuss them much), and wait for a war. Officers
and enlisted men alike were being warehoused
for war; not surprisingly, both became bored
and focused on other things. But the lens
of class can be just as reductionist as that of
professionalization can be teleological; neither
alone explains complex institutions.
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